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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare tradeo between patent and antitrust law. Since patent
and antitrust law have contradictory goals, the question that naturally arises is how one should
choose between the two in instances where there is a conict. One sensible approach to choosing
between two legal standards, or between proof standards with respect to evidence, is to consider
the relative costs of errors. The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to
false negatives in patent antitrust. We nd that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust
is the proportion of the sum of the monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus to the
deadweight loss. This error cost ratio, for a wide range of deterministic demand functions, ranges
from innity to a low of roughly three. This suggests that patent antitrust law should err on the
side of protecting innovation incentives.
JEL Classications: K21, L43, O31, O34
Keywords: Patent Antitrust, Patent Monopoly, False Positives, False Convictions, False Negatives,
False Acquittals, Error Costs, Ratio Tests
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the welfare tradeo between patent and antitrust law. Patent law enables the
patent holder to obtain and exploit a monopoly lawfully. Antitrust law regulates the acquisition,
maintenance, and, to some degree, the exploitation of monopoly power.
Since patent and antitrust law have supercially contradictory goals, the question that naturally
arises is how one should choose between the two in instances where there appears to be a conict.
There are methods of exploiting patent monopolies that have been treated as antitrust violations. For
example, the Federal Trade Commission recently sued Qualcomm, a manufacturer of communications
technology, on the theory that the rm had abused its patent monopoly by adopting a two-part
pricing scheme in the licensing and sale of its smartphone semiconductor chips.
One sensible approach to choosing between two legal standards, or two proof standards with
respect to evidence, is to consider the relative costs of errors. Overenforcement generates false
positives, cases where the regulated rm is punished or prohibited from taking a certain action
when society should prefer that the action be taken. Underenforcement generates false negatives,
cases where society should prefer that the excused rm be punished or prohibited from taking action.
The approach in this paper is to consider the ratio of false positives to false negatives in the
patent antitrust area. A high error cost would imply that antitrust should be reluctant to restrain
patentees. Moreover, proof standards and legal doctrines should be biased toward protecting inno-
vation incentives.
We nd that the relevant error cost ratio for patent antitrust is the ratio of the sum of the
monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus to the deadweight loss. This is dierent from the
prot-deadweight loss (reward-social loss) ratio advanced in the literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert
and Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990). The reward-loss ratio is a doubtful measure of the patent-
antitrust welfare tradeo because it does not take into account the residual surplus to consumers,
and thereby underweights the social value of innovation.
We nd that the error cost ratio, for a wide variety of deterministic demand functions, ranges
from innity to a low of roughly three. This supports a bias, when designing legal standards and
proof standards in patent antitrust law, in favor of the patent holder.
2 Baseline Model
We assume patent protection gives the innovator a monopoly in a market that exists only because
of a prior investment by the innovator. In the rst period, the prospective patentee invests in
innovation, and in the second period, the innovator is awarded a patent (with probability one) that
guarantees a monopoly in the market created by the innovation.1 The costs of innovation are sunk
1An alternative version of innovation, more consistent with process inventions, assumes that innovation consists of
reducing the cost of producing some good in an existing market. The version here, where innovation creates a new
market, and the aforementioned alternative are the same when the process innovation reduces cost to such a degree
that the innovator gets the entire market to himself - that is, completely drives out of business the inecient rms -
2












Figure 1: Error Cost Ratio
when the second period arrives.
The patentee-monopolist faces a downward-sloping inverse demand curve p = p(q) and constant
marginal cost of c. The rm's prot maximization problem is
max
q
: π(q) = p(q)q − cq.
The monopolistic output q? satises the familiar optimality condition p′(q?)q?+p(q?) = c. Denoting
demand elasticity at a price p by ε(p) = − q
′(p)






The patentee anticipates all of this when he invests in innovation in the rst period.
Under competition, price would marginal cost, pc = c, and the competitive quantity qc = p−1(pc).
Figure 1 illustrates the standard monopoly outcome, with prot denoted by Π, the residual surplus
denoted RS , and deadweight loss, from constraining output below the competitive level, D .
3 Error Cost Ratio
In this part, we consider the welfare tradeos of antitrust enforcement in the intellectual property
area. Although we focus on patents, the model applies equally to many other types of intellectual
property (copyrights, trade secrets, trademarks).
Figure 1 illustrates our basic argument. In the gure, pBE is the break-even price necessary for
even when charging the monopoly price.
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the innovator to recover the xed (sunk) costs of innovation. If the price the rm expects to receive
in the second period is less than the break-even price, the rm will not invest in innovation (research
and development, R&D).
We incorporate antitrust, in Figure 1, as a mechanism that operates as a price regulation, p̂. This
is dierent from the more traditional economic model of antitrust operating as a penalty imposed on
monopolizing rms.2 Here, antitrust operates as an injunction, constraining the rm from choosing
its preferred price-output combination along the demand curve.
If the anticipated antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even price, the rm
will innovate and charge up to the price cap. If the anticipated antitrust price cap is less than the
break-even price, the rm will not invest in the rst period, and no entry will occur.
The most stringent antitrust regime is equivalent to a price cap equal to marginal cost. In this
case, antitrust is so eective that the innovator will be forced to charge the competitive price in the
second period. Obviously, investment will occur in the rst period, in this case, only if the break-
even price is equal to marginal cost. That will occur only if research and development is essentially
costless, which is likely to be rare. An example of an injunctive policy that would implement a price
cap equal to marginal cost is a rule denying enforceability to the patent, thus opening the market
to competition and driving price down to marginal cost.
The most relaxed antitrust regime would set the eective price cap at the monopoly price p?.
With an antitrust-regulated price cap greater than or equal to the monopoly price, the innovator
would never be deterred by the threat of antitrust regulation from investing.
Perfect antitrust, in this model, reduces to setting the antitrust price cap equal to the break-even
price. With the antitrust cap set at the break-even price, the innovator will invest, and society will
get the benet from innovation with the smallest possible deadweight loss.
If the antitrust price cap is less than the break-even price, society loses the gain from innovation.
The rm will not invest in innovation and the minimum social loss is the sum of consumer's surplus
and the rm's prot in the unconstrained regime,




Society does not lose the potential welfare captured by area D in Figure 1 because this portion of the
potential surplus from innovation would never have been available to society in the unconstrained
regime.3
In contrast, if the antitrust-regulated price cap is greater than the break-even price, themaximum
2See Becker (1968), Landes (1983), Hylton and Lin (2014).
3All of this assumes, of course, that the patent award is based on an innovation rather than a fraud on the patent
oce, or corruption in the patent system. In the latter case, no new surplus is created, and the social loss from setting
the price cap below the break-even price would be zero. Consider, for example, a patent for playing cards, as in Darcy
v. Allein, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B. 1603). As a general matter one could introduce a measure of the probability of
real innovation (in contrast to fraudulent) and multiply the sum of prot and residual surplus by such a validity
probability to arrive at a measure of the social loss. The analysis here assumes implicitly that the validity probability
is one.
4
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Errors, in this framework, are deviations from perfect antitrust enforcement. An error in the
direction of excessive enforcement, where the antitrust price cap is below the break-even price,
results in false conviction or false positive costs. Errors in the direction of too little enforcement,
where the antitrust price cap is greater than the break-even price, result in false acquittal or false
negative costs. For enforcement authorities, the error cost ratio - that is, the ratio of false positive
costs to false negative costs - provides guidance on the optimal direction of any bias due to errors in
enforcement. For adjudicatory tribunals, the error cost ratio provides guidance on the standard of
proof that should govern in disputes over whether a rm has violated antitrust law. More generally,
the error cost ratio also serves as a measure of the welfare tradeo relevant to any conict between
the scope of the patent laws and the scope of antitrust laws. This measure of the welfare tradeo
diers from the ratio test (reward-to-social-loss ratio) advanced in parts of the patent antitrust
literature.







This quotient provides a lower-bound measure, taking account the dierent levels of stringency in
antitrust enforcement, of the ratio of the cost of excessive enforcement (false convictions) to the cost
of inadequate enforcement (false acquittals) in the patent antitrust area.
Under traditional decision theory arguments (Kaplan, 1968; Burtis, Gelbach, Kobayashi, 2018),
an error cost ratio equal to one would justify a balanced approach to the standard of proof, such
as the preponderance standard. Such a standard would treat prospective errors in the direction of
excessive enforcement as equally costly as prospective errors in the direction of lenient enforcement.
On the other hand, a ratio of one third would justify an approach that favors patent challengers
(implementers), say by adopting a rebuttable presumption of guilt in patent-antitrust cases. A ratio
considerably higher than one, such as three, would justify a proof standard favoring the innovator.
These implications of the error cost ratio should be considered while also taking into account that
it is a minimum estimate. Thus, if the ratio presented above is greater than one, given a particular
market structure, the actual ratio in applications to specic regulatory interventions within the
particular market typically will be even greater. If the ratio is greater than one, then the case for
adopting a proof standard favoring the innovator is even stronger than implied by the numerical
value of the ratio.
Simply looking at the ratio formula, however, it is impossible to tell what the value of it might
be. It seems plausible, initially, that some market structures might generate a high ratio, and others
might generate a low ratio. In the abstract, a demand function could take a shape that could
5
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generate almost any positive numerical value as a ratio estimate. However, we limit the range of
possibilities below by examining plausible and widely used functional forms.
We analyze the error cost ratio rst by a linear demand function. Then we relax the assumption
to show that the qualitative results are robust over several commonly used demand assumptions.
3.1 Linear Demand
Assume the demand function takes the form p = A− bq, where A > 0 and b > 0. The basic results
are summarized in Proposition 1. Later, in the next subsection, we show that the qualitative result
holds under more robust assumptions on the demand function.
Proposition 1 (Linear Demand). If the demand curve is linear and marginal cost is constant,







Under linear demand, the error cost ratio is a constant value of three. If the error cost ratio
happened to be one, there would be a credible argument for adopting a balanced approach to patent
antitrust where the risk of excessive enforcement is equated with the risk of inadequate enforcement.
In terms of proof standards for adjudication, this would be equivalent to a preponderance test.
However, an error cost ratio of three is more consistent with a biased approach to the risk of
excessive enforcement, where the bias favors leniency toward the regulated party (Burtis, Gelbach,
Kobayashi, 2018). Alternatively, the ratio of three suggests in the adjudication setting a clear and
convincing standard of proof. We consider below whether this implication is also valid for other
common representations of consumer demand.
3.2 Power-law Demand
In this part we consider power-law demand functions, such as the isoelastic, algebraic, and expo-
nential forms. The advantage of these forms over the linear is that they better represent demand in
settings of wealth inequality or where a relatively small number of consumers bid intensively for the
good (e.g, medical care).
Consider the algebraic demand form, p = αqβ − σ, β ∈ (−1, 0). After that, we will examine the
results under isoelastic and exponential functional form. Linear and isoelastic demand functions are
special cases of the algebraic form. In particular, if α = −b, β = 1, and σ = −A, the algebraic
demand function turns to be a linear demand function. If σ = 0, the algebraic demand function
becomes an isoelastic demand function, p = αqβ .
6
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Proposition 2 (Algebraic Demand). If the demand curve is algebraic p = αqβ − σ, β ∈




































which ranges, as the elasticity of demand increases, from +∞ to a lower bound of 1e/2−1 .
The algebraic demand form does not generate a constant elasticity. Elasticity is ε(p) = − pβ(p+σ) ,
so introducing the parameter ε, where ε ≡ − 1β , allows us to examine the behavior of the error cost
ratio as demand elasticity goes to innity.5 As demand becomes more inelastic, the error cost ratio
approaches innity. As demand becomes more elastic, the error cost ratio falls to its lower bound
of 1e/2−1 ≈ 2.8.
In more intuitive terms, Proposition 2 says that for relatively uncompetitive markets - where
the elasticity of demand is still above but close to one - the error cost ratio is extremely high. For
such markets, the sum of prot and consumer surplus is very large relative to deadweight loss, and
society loses much more than one dollar for each dollar of deadweight loss avoided through excessive
antitrust regulaiton. The error cost ratio falls toward its lower bound of roughly 2.8 as the market
moves toward perfect competition.
Proposition 3 (Isoelastic Demand). If the demand curve is isoelastic p = αqβ, β ∈ (−1, 0), and




























This case delivers the same result as the algebraic demand case, and again the error cost ratio
ranges with the elasticity of demand from positive innity to a limiting lower bound of 1e/2−1 . Figure
2 shows the relationship between the error cost ratio and the elasticity of demand for the isoelastic
case.6
4We deliberately express this as the dierence of two areas (RS+Π+D - (RS +Π)) to facilitiate comparison of the
areas under the demand curve.
5Since the dependent variable of interest is the error cost ratio, which assumes optimization by the monopolist,
we could just as well examine the point elasticity at the optimal output level. Substituting the monopoly price,




, so that the parameter ε ≡ − 1
β
closely tracks the relevant point elasticity measure. If σ is small
relative to c, then the parameter is a nearly precise measure of point elasticity at the privately optimal quantity.
6In Figure 2, the error cost ratio is equal to 3 when elasticity is equal to 2, equal to 4 when elasticity is roughly
1.3, and equal to 6 when elasticity is roughly 1.1.
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Proposition 4 (Exponential Demand). If the demand curve is exponential form q = γe−βp,




e , the maximum false acquittal cost is D =
1
βγe






Like the linear case, exponential demand delivers an error cost ratio that is independent of market
structure as measured by the elasticity of demand. Of the demand functions considered in this part,
the exponential generates the lowest error cost ratio, which is a constant value of 1e/2−1 ≈ 2.8.
7 The
linear and the exponential also share the feature that there is a maximum price that consumers are
willing to pay, above which demand falls to zero. However, in most markets, there is always some
consumer willing to bid up the price of a scarce item. In particular, in markets characterized by
wealth inequality among consumers, the wealthiest consumers can bid up the price of a scarce and
highly desirable good (e.g., housing) to a level that is quite well beyond aordability for the average
consumer. Given this, the algebraic probably best captures the features of real markets.





















Figure 2: Error Cost Ratio and Demand Elasticity
7That the error cost ratio for the exponential is less than that of the linear is consistent with the feature that the
ratio of the monopolistic output to the competitive output is lower in the exponential case than in the linear case.
The monopolistic output level is half of the competitive output level in the linear case, whereas in the exponential case
the monopolistic level is equal to the competitive level divided by the natural base e. Since the deadweight loss from
monopoly is generally greater under exponential demand, the error cost ratio associated with antitrust intervention
is lower.
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4 Model Extension
This section presents an extended model incorporating the probability of violating antitrust law to
explicitly model the rm's stage-1 investment decision and the error cost ratio. The reason is to
separate the eect of market structure on the probability of entry (investment) and on the error
cost ratio. By separating these two eects, we can capture both the static and dynamic eects of
changes in market structure on the error cost ratio.
At stage 1, the rm observes the R&D investment cost K and decides whether to invest in
innovation. The choice variable at stage 1 is denoted as r ∈ {0, 1}, where r = 1 denotes the rm
invests in R&D and enters the subgame of stage 2, and r = 0 denotes the rm dose not enter and
the game ends. If r = 1, the rm incurs the xed cost of R&D and enters into stage 2. At stage 2,
the rm is possibly faced with antitrust challenge. Let v denote the probability that the rm is held
violating the antitrust law and gets zero economic prot in stage 2.
This framework diers from the previous part by treating antitrust enforcement as all or noth-
ing. As a result, the error cost ratio is the same as before, though this time it represents the
consistent value, given a specic demand curve, rather than the minimum taking account dierent
levels of enforcement stringency. However, the probability of enforcement aects the incentive to
invest and the likelihood of deadweight loss arising.
4.1 Stage-1 Choice
Assume that the probability of antitrust legal enforcement is xed at a level v, v ∈ (0, 1). The





= f(K) is positive everywhere. Assume the rm is risk neutral.
We solve the rm's entry game by backward induction. From our proceeding result in the
previous section, if the rm continues to stage 2 as a monopoly, it charges monopoly price p∗ and
gets monopoly prot π∗. Given that v is the probability that the rm is held in violation of the
antitrust law, the expected stage-2 utility is
E [U2(r = 1)] = (1− v)π∗
where r = 1 means that the rm invests in R&D in stage 1, U2 denotes the rm's utility at stage 2.
If the rm does not invest in R&D, it earns zero. It optimizes by choosing whether to invest or not
in stage 1. Thus the rm's stage 1 maximal utility is
U1 = max {E [U2(r = 1)]−K, 0}
Therefore, the rm invests in R&D to continue in stage 2, if and only if E [U2(r = 1)]−K ≥ 0, that
is,
r = 1 if and only if (1− v)π∗ ≥ K
9
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Let θ denote the probability that the rm invests in R&D, and is called probability of entry in
later analyses.8 We have the following expression for θ,
θ
.
= Probability{(1− v)π∗ ≥ K} = F [(1− v)π∗]
To study the eect of market structure on rm's R&D investment decision, we study how market
structure aects the monopoly prot π∗ which then determines the rm's entry decision.
∂θ
∂π∗
= f ((1− v)π∗) · (1− v) > 0 (1)
The condition in Equation (1) indicates, in accord with intuition, that the rm's investment decision
depends positively on the monopoly prot expected at stage 2.
The Probability of Entry and the Adjusted Error Cost Ratio As analyzed in the proceeding
part, if the rm does not invest in R&D, the society loses RS + π. If the rm invests in R&D and
monopolizes in stage 2, the society loses monopoly deadweight loss D. Taking the rm's R&D










The eect of entry probability on error cost is captured by the partial derivative of ρ̃ with regard to












Thus, the error cost ratio decreases as the likelihood of innovation investment increases, and this
negative relationship grows at an increasing rate. Other things equal, excessive enforcement is less
harmful to society where there are strong incentives to invest because of high expected monopoly
prots or low research and development costs. In addition, a little increase in the investment
probability has a larger downward eect on the error cost ratio in an industry where rms have
more and frequent R&D than in an industry with less R&D intensity.
8Because R&D investment is a xed amount, the optimality decision for the patentee is straightforward, unlike
the Nordaus (1967) model where the innovator chooses the amount to invest in innovation and therefore equates
the marginal cost of investment with its marginal private benet. Treating R&D investment as a lump sum seems
defensible, since the end goal of the innovator is some denite new product in this model. The inventor cannot invest
half of the required amount in R&D and get some fraction of the payo. The variation in K reects the implicit
assumption that the cost of the required investment is greater for some innovators than for others.
10
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4.2 Eect of Market Structure
The price elasticity of demand is an important feature of market structure, and usually varies across
industries (Johnson and Helmberger, 1967). A number of industry-specic characteristics contribute
to the pattern of demand elasticity, such as the degree of substitutability between goods. If a product
does not have substitutes, such as some drugs and treatments for rare diseases, the product's demand
is likely to be inelastic. Path dependence (switching costs) is another factor giving rise to inelastic
demand (Klemperer, 1987). Path dependence is a common feature observed in the demand for high
tech products, such as online platforms and operating systems. Because consumers take time to
adapt to a new technology, they tend to continue using related products from the same rm and are
willing to pay a price premium for doing so.9
4.2.1 Negative relationship between elasticity and prot.
Generally speaking, a low demand elasticity reveals the consumer's high tolerance to price increases,
and that the monopolist can exploit this high tolerance to earn more prots. In this sense, an
industry with low demand elasticity is favorable for a monopoly rm (Kamien and Schwartz (1970)).
Of course, demand elasticity varies along the demand curve in most cases. To study the eect of
demand elasticity on proft, we will rst have to construct a parameter that tracks the elasticity
measure at all points along the demand curve. By examining the relationship between such a measure
of elasticity and prot, we can draw inferences on the relationship between market structure and
protability.
We start by considering the power demand functions: isoelastic, algebraic, and exponential. For
the isoelastic form p = αqβ, β < 0, the price elasticity of demand is simply ε = − 1β , which obviously
tracks elasticity at all points along the demand curve. The monopoly prot under isoelastic demand













Generally, the elasticity of demand for each of the power demand functions can be expressed as
ε(p) ≡ εf(p), where the ε is a parameter that tracks the elasticity of demand. In the algebraic case
ε(p) = − pβ(p+σ) , so that ε = −
1
β and f(p) =
p
(p+σ) . In the isoelastic case ε = −
1
β andf(p) = 1. In
the exponential case, ε(p) = −βp, so that ε = β and f(p) = p. For this class of demand functions,
(2) holds.
9One example is Android system or iOS. After a consumer purchases the rst Apple product and gets used to the
iOS system, the iOS shapes the consumer's habit of using smartphones. If she changes to the Android system, it takes
her time to adjust.
11
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3365034 
Although the parameterization is not as straightforward, a similar decomposition can be accom-
plished with linear demand, where the same negative relationship between prot and the elasticity
tracking parameter holds.10
4.2.2 Dynamic Eect of Market Structure on Error Cost Ratio.
Recall that in section 3, we demonstrated that the probability of investment (entry) increases with
monopoly prot. Combining this with the negative relationship between prot and demand elasticity,









To consider the eect of market structure on the error cost ratio, we analyze the derivative of













 − ρθ2 ∂θ∂ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
dynamic eect
 (4)
where the rst part in Equation (4), which is negative, is the static eect of elasticity on the error
cost ratio, discussed in section 2. The second term, which is positive, captures the dynamic eect
of the demand elasticity on the error cost ratio. As the post-patent award market becomes more
competitive, because of the greater availability of substitutes, investment and entry are less likely,
increasing the error cost ratio. On one hand, low elasticity leads a higher monopoly prot and
residual surplus relative to deadweight loss, leading to a larger error cost as the direct impact, which
we call the static eect in this model. On the other hand, the higher monopoly prot expected in
stage 2 encourages entry, partially osetting the static eect.
The conicting static and dynamic eects suggest that the relationship between demand elas-
ticity and error cost may not be negative as suggested in some of our earlier analyses of demand
functions. The limiting ratio derived for the algebraic and isoelastic cases is larger than 1e/2−1 when
the entry/investment eect is taken into account. Indeed, for the linear and exponential cases,
where the static eect is zero, increasing demand elasticity (making the market more competitive)
generates only a dynamic eect, raising the limiting error cost ratio.
4.2.3 Example: Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution.
As an illustration, assume demand is isoelastic and that the probability distribution that determines
θ is uniform, i.e., the R&D investment cost K follows a uniform distribution on (0, K̄], where K̄
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denotes the upper bound of investment cost. It follows that if expected prot is greater than the
upper bound on investment cost, the rm is sure to enter. If expected prot is below the upper bound,
then the entry probability is determined by the cumulative distribution function of K. Formally, we
have
θ =
1 if (1− v)π∗ ≥ K̄(1−v)π∗
K̄
if (1− v)π∗ < K̄
The adjusted error cost ratio taking into account the dynamic eect of enforcement can now be














if (1− v)π∗ < K̄



































The rst line in equation (5) reects the static eect, which is negative,11 while the second line
is that of the dynamic eect, which is positive.12 Whether the static eect dominates the dynamic
eect depends on the comparison of the absolute values of the two lines in equation (5). Thus, the
11The term K̄









derivative of the error cost ratio with respect to ε. We have shown in Section 3 that the error cost ratio ρ decreases
















This illustrates our argument that the static eect takes negative sign.
12As the expected prot, investment cost and the error cost ratio are all positive, we have K̄
(1−v)π∗ ρ > 0. From the
negative relationship between elasticity and monopoly prot under isoelastic demand (appendix A3), we have that
ln( ε
ε−1 ) − ln
α
c
> 0. Combine these results, we have that
K̄









This implies a positive dynamic eect of demand elasticity on the error cost ratio.
13
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(a) Static vs. Dynamic Eects























(b) Error Cost Ratio and Adjusted Ratio
Figure 3: Adjusted Error Cost Ratio





















If this condition holds (6), the static eect is dominant and the adjusted error cost ratio decreases
with elasticity. Otherwise, the error cost ratio increases with elasticity, the opposite of our result in
Section 2.
Figure 3 shows a simulation of the relationship between static and dynamic eects, and of the
relationship between the adjusted and static error cost ratios. Both gures assume a modest antitrust
enforcement probability of 0.2.13 As shown in Figure 3a, the dynamic eect overtakes the static
eect after the elasticity becomes greater than 1.06.
Figure 3b compares the error cost ratio and the adjusted error cost ratio curves. For relatively
low elasticity values, the adjusted error cost ratio is below the error cost ratio. For relatively high
elasticity levels, the adjusted curve is above the static error cost ratio, eventually going to innity.
The intuition behind this pattern is the following. For high elasticity values, the market is relatively
competitive, and prot expectations are low. As a result, the rate of entry/investment is low, and
approaching zero as the market becomes perfectly competitive. Because entry is so low, and the
expectant deadweight loss from monopoly pricing therefore low, the adjusted error cost ratio steadily
13Other parameter assumptions are K̄ = 2, c = 8, α = 2. The same parameter values are assumed in Appendix B
which shows adjusted ratios under other enforcement probabilities.
14
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goes to innity.
Conversely, when the demand elasticity is relatively low, so that the market is not competitive,
rms expected to earn relatively large prots. Now the likelihood of entry and investment is high,
reducing the adjusted error cost ratio below its static counterpart.
Though the adjusted error cost ratio dips below the (static) error cost ratio for low elasticity
values (i.e., uncompetitive markets), note that it is always well above the asymptotic limit of 1e/2−1
for the isoelastic demand case. Indeed, the minimum value of the adjusted error cost ratio in this
simulation is greater than ve. In the appendix we consider additional simulations with higher
probabilities of enforcement, one intermediate with the probability enforcement set at 0.5 and the
other a high-enforcement regime with a probability of 0.8. In both of the additional simulations
the adjusted error cost ratio is greater, at each elasticity value, than in modest enforcement regime
simulated in Figure 3.
Although we believe the assumptions in these simulations are reasonable, we do not intend to
suggest that they provide a representation of the relationship of the error cost ratio to the adjusted
error cost ratio for every conceivable demand function or investment cost distribution. It is possible
to generate an example where the adjusted ratio falls below one. Indeed, in the case of exponential
demand, where the error cost ratio has a constant value, the adjusted ratio could start from a level
below the error cost ratio (for low elasticity) before going to innity.14 Given this, a measure of the
average value of the adjusted error cost ratio over a wide range of elasticity values might oer an
alternative single measurement.
5 Implications
The foregoing analysis has examined the welfare tradeos of antitrust enforcement in the innovation
setting. We have focused on antitrust regulation of patentees, though the issues addressed here apply
to any area where rms make investments that create new markets or substantially enhance existing
markets. The tradeos examined here have implications for many facets of law enforcement. First,
society must determine the level of resources to pour into the antitrust enforcement eort against
patent holders. In other words, what is the optimal probability of enforcement when monopolists
have obtained their status through innovation? Second, society must determine an optimal legal
standard - for example, whether to apply a per se prohibition, a per se legality rule, or a rule of
reason test. Third, society must choose the optimal standard of proof in trials, where the occurrence
of an antitrust violation under the operable legal standard is uncertain. For each of these questions,
the tradeo between the costs of excessive enforcement and the costs of inadequate enforcement
should be considered in determining the features of an optimal enforcement system.
14For high enforcement probabilities, the adjusted error cost ratio curve will always be above the error cost ratio
curve for all elasticity parameter values. However, for low enforcement probabilities it is possible to get a range of
low elasticity values where the adjusted error cost curve is below the error cost curve under certain parameter values,
but this requires an assumption that the upper bound on investment cost in the uniform probability model is modest
relative to expected prot. Such an assumption would appear to go against intuition.
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In this paper's model, we begin with a perfect enforcement ideal, and consider the cost of devi-
ating from the ideal toward excessive enforcement, and the cost of deviating from the ideal toward
inadequate enforcement. The ratio of these two costs, which we label the error cost ratio, consti-
tutes the appropriate welfare ratio test for determining optimal antitrust enforcement in the patent
context. The perfect enforcement ideal is met when antitrust enforcement enables the innovating
monopolist to recover its research and development costs, and also prevents the rm from imposing
unnecessary deadweight loss on society.
Using the foregoing approach to dening perfect enforcement, we nd that the error cost ratio for
patent antitrust, or alternatively the appropriate welfare tradeo ratio for patent antitrust, is equal
to the sum of the monopoly prot and the residual consumer surplus all divided by the deadweight
loss. This nding contradicts the view suggested in the literature (Kaplow, 1984; Gilbert and
Shapiro, 1990; Klemperer, 1990) that the relevant welfare ratio for patent antitrust is the prot
divided by the deadweight loss (reward-loss ratio).
The reward-loss ratio appears to be invalid for assessing the welfare tradeos in patent antitrust
because it accords inadequate weight to the residual surplus going to consumers, and in doing so
undercounts the social value of innovation. One immediate implication is that prescriptions for
patent antitrust law based on the reward-loss framework should be reconsidered from a perspective
that gives greater consideration to the social incentive to innovate.
We nd that the error cost ratio is genearlly well above one, and declines as function of market
competitiveness as measured by the elasticity of demand. The minimum value of the ratio is roughly
equal to three under commonly used demand functions. When the eects of enforcement on inno-
vation are taken into account, the adjusted error cost ratio is likely to be even greater, and tends
toward innity as the elasticity of demand increases. These results suggest that society should show
a greater concern for the costs of excessive enforcement than the costs of inadequate enforcement of
antitrust in the patent context. The law should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives.
These implications have immediate practical relevance. There are novel theories of antitrust
being applied to patentees currently. In an ongoing lawsuit against Qualcomm, the FTC claims
that the rm's patent licensing fees are an abusive exercise of monopoly power. Such eorts to
introduce antitrust regulation into areas that had until recently been controlled almost entirely by
patent law should be assessed under a consideration of the associated error costs. An attack on
patent pricing as a form of monopoly abuse is equivalent to introducing price regulation through
antitrust. Determination of the welfare-maximizing antitrust price cap, which encourages innovation
and at the same time avoids unnecessary deadweight loss, is subject to uncertainty. Such an eort
should err on the side of protecting innovation incentives, given the high ratio of false-positive costs
to false-negative costs.
In other areas of litigation, courts must determine whether to apply a per se legality test, per se
illegality test, or rule of reason test to alleged antitrust violations by patent holders.15 For example,
15On error costs and legal tests in antirust, see Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009).
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settlements of patent infringement lawsuits were until recently examined under antitrust according
to a per se legality test. Such settlements have typically involved the patent holder transferring a
share of the patent revenue to the challenger, which traditionally has been deemed within the power
of a patent holder. The Supreme Court overturned the per se legality rule and replaced it with a
rule of reason test, for pharmaceutical patent infringement settlements, in FTC v. Actavis.16 The
rule of reason test has led to numerous lawsuits against pharmaceutical patent holders for entering
into settlements with generic drug makers. The error cost ratios examined here suggest that the
Actavis analysis should be conducted in a manner that takes into consideration the high error cost
ratio for patent antitrust.17
Lastly, there is the question of the appropriate standard of proof in antitrust challenges of patent
holders. The error cost ratio, when applied to this question, would support a high burden of proof,
such as requiring clear and convincing evidence to support antitrust theories.
6 Conclusion
The error cost ratio - that is, the ratio of false-positive to false-negative costs - for patent antitrust is
equal to the sum of the monopoly prot and residual consumer surplus all divided by the deadweight
loss. We nd that this ratio ranges from innity, in uncompetitive markets (no substitutes to the
patent), to a low of roughly three, in competitive markets, for commonly used demand functions.
When we extend the analysis to take enforcement's eect on entry into account, we nd that the
range of values for the ratio is even higher under reasonable assumptions. This implies that patent
antitrust rules, from substantive law to proof standards, should tilt generally in favor of patentees.
16570 U.S. 136 (2013).
17Another example of the choice over how to implement the legal standard is observed in the area of predatory
innovation claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits monopolization. The choice here is between
the rule of reason test described in United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), or the innovator-favoring
version of the test articulated, specically for predatory innovation claims, in Allied Orthopedic v. Tyco Healthcare,
592 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2010).
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Appendix
Appendix A: Model Results
A1. Error Cost Ratio under Common Demand Function Assumptions
Proposition 1.
The demand curve is linear p = A − bq and the marginal cost is a constant c. Optimal output is
q? = A−c2b and monopolistic price p
? = A+c2 . The competitive price is p
c = c and output is qc = A−cb .
The minimum social loss under antitrust law that deters entry is RS + π = 3(A−c)
2
8b , the maximum
social loss if the rm is allowed to enter the market is D = (A−c)
2
8b . The error cost ratio is therefore
ρ ≡ RS+πD = 3.
Proposition 2.
The demand curve is algebraic p = αqβ−σ and the marginal cost is a constant c, so the rm's prot
maximization problem is maxq : (αq













minimum social loss when antitrust law deters entry is given by
RS + π =
∫ q?
0




q?β+1 − (σ + c)q?
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with β ∈ (−1, 0). Because e = limn→∞(1 + 1n)
n, it follows that limβ→0(1 + β)











2 · e− 1
≈ 2.8.
Proposition 4.
The demand curve is exponential q = γe−βp and the marginal cost is a constant c. The inverse
demand curve is p = β−1 ln γ − β−1 ln q. Optimal output satises β−1 ln γ − β−1 ln q − β−1 = c, so
that q? = γe−(βc+1) and p? = βc+1β . The competitive price is p
c = c and output is qc = γe−βc. The
social loss under antitrust law that deters rm's entry is



























































A.2 Eect of Elasticity on Error Cost Ratio under Isoelastic Demand
From proposition 1 and 4, we have that the error cost ratio is a constant number when the demand
function is linear or exponential. However, when the demand function is algebraic p = αqβ − σ, or
is isoelasticp = αqβ, where β ∈ (−1, 0), the error cost ratio is a function of demand elasticity. We
claim that the ratio ρ decreases with regard ε
.
= − 1β .
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Since demand elasticity parameter is given by ε
.









To study the relationship between ρ and ε, we can rst analyze the relationship between 1ρ and













































































































decreasing with ε in (1,+∞).
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A3. Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Prot
Lemma 2. (Negative Relationship between Elasticity and Prot) The price elasticity
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(iii) The price elasticity of exponential demand function is given by
εexp(p) = βp.




for the above three cases.
Case I: Isolastic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 3, we have











Then we have the monopoly prot is given by
π∗
.






















lnπ∗ = (1− ε)lnc+ (ε− 1)ln(ε− 1)− ε(lnε− lnα) (14)
We can back out the sign of derivative ∂π
∗
∂ε from the sign of
∂(lnπ∗)
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Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0),we have
β ∈ (−1, 0)⇒ ε > 1













Case II: Algebraic Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 2, we





and monopolistic price is p? = σ+cβ+1 − σ.
Then we have the monopoly prot is given by
π∗
.


























= αεε−ε(c+ σ)1−ε(ε− 1)ε−1
Then we have
lnπ∗ = (ε− 1)ln(ε− 1) + (1− ε)ln(σ + c) + εlnα− ε ln ε. (16)
We can back out the sign of derivative ∂π
∗
∂ε from the sign of
∂(lnπ∗)















= ln(ε− 1)− ln ε− ln(σ + c) + lnα,
Then from the model primitive β ∈ (−1, 0), we have
β ∈ (−1, 0)⇒ ε > 1
⇒ ln(ε− 1)− ln ε < 0.
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Case III: Exponential Demand Function From the proceeding result in the Proposition 4, the
monopoly quantity, under exponential demand function, is q? = γe−(βc+1) and monopolistic price is
p? = βc+1β . The monopoly prot is given by
π∗ = (p∗ − c) q? = γ
β
e(−1−βc).
From proceeding result, we have that the elasticity parameter εAexp = β. Thus, to analyze the eect
of market elasticity parameter on the monopoly prot, we take the partial derivative of prot with
regard to β, i.e.,
∂π∗
∂β













A4. Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution of Investment Cost
Assume the R&D investment cost follows uniform distribution on (0, K̄]. To compute the adjusted
error cost ratio, we rst compute the probability of a rm with the rm's entry decision in period














where the rm enters regardless of enforcement, if (1− v)π∗ > K̄, thus,
ρ̃ =
0 if (1− v)π∗ > K̄( K̄(1−v)π∗ − 1)ρ if (1− v)π∗ ≤ K̄
When elasticity is not small, such that (1− v)π∗ ≤ K̄. the adjusted error cost ratio taking into
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Static and Dynamic Eects under Isoelastic Demand and Uniform Distribution of In-
vestment Cost
The static eect is dened by 1−θθ
∂ρ







































































The dynamic eect is dened by − ρ
θ2
∂θ
∂ε . Plug equation (17) in the expression of dynamic eect,
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We can compare the magnitude of static and dynamic eects by the absolute value of equation











































































1 + ρ =
εε
εε − (2ε− 1)(ε− 1)ε−1
(26)
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Plug equation (26) back in the comparison inequality (23), we have that static eect dominates,
if (
K̄ − (1− v)π∗
)
εε
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Appendix B. Simulations with Varying Enforcement Probability
In this appendix, we show how the adjusted error cost ratio changes according to the antitrust
enforcement probability. In the main text, we show the adjusted error cost ratio and corresponding
static and dynamic eects under a modest enforcement probability, v = 0.2. If the enforcement
probability increases, the adjusted error cost ratio curve shifts up. So does the dynamic eect
curves, while the change in the static eect is smaller than the change in the dynamic eect.
Medium Enforcement Probability In Figure 4, we assume the enforcement probability is at
the intermediate level, v = 0.5. The adjusted error cost ratio is higher than that under v = 0.2 (see
Figure 3 in main text). The lower bound of the adjusted error cost ratio now is about 13, which
occurs when the demand elasticity is about 1.09.






































Figure 4: Medium Enforcement Probability v = 0.5
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High Enforcement Probability In Figure 5, we assume the enforcement probability is high,
v = 0.8. The adjusted error cost ratio curve shifts up further in Figure 5 than in Figure 4. The
lower bound of the adjusted error cost ratio now is about 42, which occurs when the demand elasticity
is about 1.11.










































Figure 5: High Enforcement Probability v = 0.8
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